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Learning how to obtain rewards (e.g., food) is important for survival. 
Behavioural and neuroscience research have suggested that reward learning 
reflects the operation of two distinct neuro-cognitive systems: the goal-
directed and habit systems (Balleine & O’Doherty, 2010). Recently, this 
dichotomy has been challenged by authors proposing that, what we thought 
were habitual responses, are better understood as goal-directed actions 
(Kruglanski & Szumowska, 2020). This letter is a critical assessment of this 
hypothesis, which in our opinion can hardly explain the results of recent 
studies. Also, we suggest that the debate about the goal-directedness of habits 
is probably insoluble from an experimental point of view and almost 
irrelevant from an applied/clinical perspective. A more fruitful approach 
might be to analyse to what extent a behaviour is controllable —regardless if 
it is purposeless or not. 
Critics of the habit literature focus their analysis on the standard 
definition of habits1: Habits are responses (R) that are triggered by a stimulus 
(S) regardless the ongoing value of its outcome (O). This outcome 
insensitivity is thought to be achieved by extensive reward training (Tricomi 
et al., 2009). As Kruglanski & Szumowska (2020) has recently pointed out, 
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1 In fields other than experimental psychology (health psychology, marketing, sports science, 
etc) habits are understood as behaviours that are frequently repeated. 
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there is not much evidence of outcome-insensitive behaviour in humans (see 
also, de Wit et al., 2018). There are, however, studies in which highly-trained 
responses persist despite being at odd with ongoing goals (e.g., Neil et al., 
2011). For these cases, Kruglanski & Szumowska (2020) and others (De 
Houwer et al , 2017; Moors et al., 2019; Moors & Houwer, 2017) came out 
with the goal replacement hypothesis: They claim that intrusions of highly-
trained responses are not produced by the activation of outcome-insensitive 
habits but by the activation of alternative goals —also called hidden goals. 
The goal replacement hypothesis might work in some scenarios, e.g., 
those related with overeating/drinking when you are satiated (social goals 
might lead you to keep consuming) but is hard to reconcile with others. 
Consider, for instance, the recent article by Hardwick et al. (2019). In this 
study, two groups of participants (more vs less extensive practice) learned 
several S-R associations; then some of these S-R associations were 
remapped. These authors showed that intrusions of the original S-R mapping 
were more frequent after overtraining and when forcing participants to 
respond very rapidly. The goal replacement hypothesis should explain why 
an alternative goal, either than solve the ongoing task in an efficient way, was 
activated during test, and what the participants tried to achieve by that goal. 
It has been claimed the activation of hidden goals aim to solve the 
discrepancy between the stimulus (S) and the ongoing goal (Moors & De 
Houwer, 2017), but in Hardwick’s experiments it is not clear what that 
discrepancy might be. 
We can apply the same analysis to one of our recent studies (Luque et 
al., 2020). Conceptually, this study shared some features with Hardwick et 
al. (2019): we also manipulated the amount of training and assessed habit 
formation in a partial reversal test, while participants had time pressure for 
responding. We found that the original S-R links interfered with correct goal-
directed reversals, as it was evident in response time data. This effect was 
especially strong after overtraining. Notably, accuracy data (proportion of 
correct reversals) did not change with training, even in some cases, improved. 
From the standard habit theory this result is straightforward: S-R links 
became stronger with training, but not strong enough to overrule the goal-
directed reversal. Because the original R and the reversal R shared the same 
triggering S, the original S-R link was automatically activated during test and 
produced a measurable interference effect over the correct goal-directed 
reversal. As in the case of Hardwick’s results, there is not a clear way to 
explain these results by using the goal replacement principle. Moreover, 
because we measured S-R links from the interference produced over correct 
reversals, we know that the actual goal of the participants was to make the 
correct reversal responses, avoiding the original one. The goal replacement 
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hypothesis should explain why and how the participants would activate any 
additional goal during test, an additional goal which was only 
counterproductive for them. 
As implausible as it might sound, we can surely force the goal 
replacement account for explaining the results from Hardwick et al. and 
Luque et al. Possible ad hoc explanations might involve automatic activations 
of hidden goals which, for some reason, would activate a wrong response (see 
Moors & De Houwer, 2017). For explaining Luque et al. results, we need to 
assume that this counterproductive goal can be kept activated at the same 
time than the main goal of doing the task just fine. This might sound forced—
but is not impossible. What leads us to the bottom-line problem: we can 
always think ad hoc explanations based in unobserved goals for explaining 
almost any pattern of results. In other words, the goal replacement is a theory 
which is extremely hard to be proven wrong, if not directly unfalsifiable. 
Then, are really habits purposeless behaviours? An unfalsifiable theory 
is not very useful for science but is not necessarily wrong, what might lead 
the whole field to be stuck in an unsolvable problem. Fortunately, if habits 
are truly goal independent might not be that relevant. Proving that a 
behaviour is goal-independent is not only an extremely hard task from an 
experimental point of view, but it is also almost irrelevant from an 
applied/clinical perspective. Think, for instance, in an OCD patient who 
cannot help to wash repeatedly their hands. Is this behaviour truly purposeless 
or not? We can expend the rest of our lives trying to figure out if this 
behaviour is automatically triggered by an S or by the activation of an 
automatic goal instead. However, what is important to know is whether that 
behaviour can be controlled under certain circumstances, and/or if we can 
modify this pattern of behaviour in a stable way. 
Studying behaviour controllability is not only more relevant from an 
applied/clinical perspective, it also might help us to escape the theoretical and 
practical complexities of studying hidden goals and purposeless behaviours. 
We can operatively establish that a response is hard or easy to control from 
the degree of interference that the response produces in an incompatible 
ongoing goal. In other words, hard to control responses are those which are 
still active even when they produce counterproductive consequences for the 
participants. Importantly, by studying hard to control responses we are 
probably tapping in the same cognitive and brain areas that are usually 
studied under the label of “habits” (see Dezfouli & Balleine, 2012), but 
avoiding unfruitful debates about what a habit truly is and/or if they are really 
purposeless. 
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